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NOTES 
Federal Estate Taxation of Community Property 
Life Insurance 
Under section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, pro-
ceeds of insurance policies on the life of the decedent payable to 
beneficiaries other than the decedent's executor are included in the 
gross estate only if the decedent possessed at the time of his death 
"any of the incidents of ownership [in the insurance policies], exer-
cisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person."1 To 
determine the extent of the decedent's "incidents of ownership," the 
Regulations provide for the application of state property law.2 The 
problems inherent in relying upon state law to &'overn federal estate 
taxation of the proceeds of life insurance policies are compounded by 
the existence in several states of a community property system.3 In 
these states, thought-provoking questions arise in two factual con-
texts. 
When the insured husband predeceases his wife, the law is well 
settled that one half of the insurance proceeds is included in the hus-
band's estate for federal estate tax purposes; the other half goes to 
the wife tax free.4 This result is dictated by the nature of community 
property. Under California law, for example, property earned by 
either spouse during the marriage is regarded as community property 
in which each spouse has a "present, existing and equal" interest.11 
1. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2042 states in part: 
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(!) RECEIVABLE BY TIIE EXECUTOR-To the extent of the amount receivable by 
the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent. 
(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTIIER BENEFICIARIES-To the extent of the amount receivable 
by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent with 
respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of owner-
ship, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person •••• 
2. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-l(c)(5) (1958) states: "As an additional step in determining 
whether or not a decedent possessed any incidents of ownership in a policy or any 
part of a policy, regard must be given to the effect of the State or other applicable law 
upon the terms of the policy •••• " See Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938): 
Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), 
3. Eight states have community property laws: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. 
4. Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938); DeLappe v. Commissioner, 113 F,2d 
48 (5th Cir. 1940); Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2042-l(b)(2), -l(c)(5) (1958): Cahn, Selected Life 
Insurance Tax Problems, TWELFTH ANN. TULANE TAX INST, 70, 82-84 (1963), The same 
rules apply to state inheritance taxes. In re Maxson's Estate, 30 Cal. App. 2d 566, 86 
P.2d 922 (1939). However, it may be necessary to give the proceeds to the husband's 
admi~istrators to pay their proportionate part of the estate's debts and expenses be-
fore the wife's community share is determined. Sieroty v. Silver, 58 Cal. 2d 799, 26 
Cal. Rptr. 635, 376 P .2d 563 (1962). In New Mexico, where the wife has only an ex-
pectancy in the community property, all proceeds are included in the husband's estate, 
Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931). 
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 161a states: "The respective interests of the husband and wife 
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Although the wife is regarded as the owner of her half of the com-
munity property, the husband has complete control and management 
of her share in a fiduciary capacity, subject to the restriction that he 
cannot make an inter vivas or testamentary gift of her share without 
her written consent. 6 If a gift of community property is made with-
out her consent, the wife has the right to revoke the entire gift during 
her husband's life, but after his death she can recall only her half of 
the gift.7 Since the wife has the power to make a testamentary dis-
position of her share of the community property, 8 her representatives 
succeed to all of her rights.9 Life insurance purchased with c;ommu-
nity funds is governed by the same community property principles 
that apply to all other forms of property;10 thus, while both hus-
band and wife are alive the wife has a vested interest in half of the 
in community property during the continuance of the marriage relationship are present, 
existing and equal interests under the management and control of the husband •••• " 
Defore the statutes were amended in 1927, the wife had an expectancy rather than a 
vested interest in community property. United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926); 
Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228 (1897). There are several exceptions 
to the community property rule. Property owned before the marriage or acquired dur-
ing the marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent is regarded as separate property. 
CAL. C1v. CODE §§ 162, 163. Property acquired by a married woman by an instrument 
in writing is presumed to be her separate property. CAL. C1v. CODE § 164. Furthermore, 
property earned by the wife is subject to her control and management until it is 
commingled with community property. CAL. C1v. CODE § 171c. When a couple moves 
to California after their marriage, their property is reclassified as "quasi-community 
property" according to community property principles. CAi. C1v. CODE § 140.7; CAL. 
PROB. CODE § 201.5; see Sclrreter, Quasi-Community Property in the Conflict of Laws, 50 
CALIF. L. REV. 206 (1963). 
6. Vai v. Dank of America Nat'! Trust &: Savings Ass'n, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 15 Cal. Rptr. 
71, 364 P.2d 247 (1961); Fields v. Michael, 91 Cal. App. 2d 443, 205 P.2d 402 (1949); 
Dazzell v. Endriss, 41 Cal. App. 2d 463, 107 P.2d 49 (1940). The husband has no manage-
ment power over the separate property of the wife. See note 5 supra. 
7. E.g., Britton v. Hammell, 4 Cal. 2d 690, 52 P.2d 221 (1935); Travelers Ins. Co. v. 
Fancher, 219 Cal. 351, 26 P.2d 482 (1933); Lynn v. Herman, 72 Cal. App. 2d 614, 165 
P.2d 54 (1946). See also 11 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 26 (1963). 
8. CAL. PROB. CoDE §§ 21, 201. The wife appears to have thi~ power in all com-
munity property states except New Mexico, where all the community property belongs 
to the husband if the wife dies first. N.M. STAT. § 29-1-8 (1907). 
9. See, e.g., In re Field's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 151, 238 P.2d 578 (1952); Mendenhall v~ 
Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 441, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1960). 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 270 F.2d 894 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 
960 (1959); Mendenhall v. Mendenhall, supra note 9. A life insurance policy in Cali-
fornia may pass by transfer, will, or succession to any person. CAL. INs. CODE § 10130. 
Insurance may be separate property, community property, or mixed, depending upon 
the source of the premium payments. If both separate property and community prop-
erty have been used to pay the premiums, the proceeds of the policy will be prorated, 
according to the ratio of separate premiums to community premiums. See, e.g., Grimm 
v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P.2d 841 (1945); In re Sear's Estate, 182 Cal. App. 2d 525, 
6 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1960); Mears v. Mears, 180 Cal. App. 2d 484, 4 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1960). 
Washington follows the same rule of proportionate ownership of proceeds based on 
amount of premiums paid with community funds, In re Towey's Estate, 22 Wash. 2d 
212, 155 P.2d 273 (1945), while -Texas has apparently rejected it, Warthan v. Haynes, 
155 Tex. 413, 288 S.W.2d 481 (1956). 
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community property life insurance,U and her husband has the power 
of management of that half. When the insured husband predeceases 
his wife, she merely receives the management and control of insur-
ance which she already owns. Even if her husband names his exec-
utor or some other party as beneficiary, and even if the policy makes 
no reference to her interest and names only the husband as owner, 
the wife can still claim her community share of the proceeds as 
against the named beneficiary.12 Although the insured husband may 
possess the usual incidents of ownership which would make the en-
tire life insurance proceeds part of his estate in a non-community 
property state, California law regards him as owning only half of 
the insurance, and therefore only one half of the proceeds is included 
in his estate for both federal estate tax and state inheritance tax 
purposes. 
On the other hand, if the wife dies before her insured husband, 
the problem becomes more complex. The amount included in the 
wife's estate under section 2033 of the Internal Revenue Code13 is 
one half of the cash surrender value of the policies at the time of 
her death.14 In order to establish the amount which should subse-
quently be included in the husband's estate at his later death, it is 
11. In re Compton's Estate, 198 Cal. App. 2d 766, 18 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1962); Menden-
hall v. Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 44, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1960); Cooke v. Cooke, 65 
Cal. App. 2d 260, 150 P.2d 514 (1944). 
12. In re Castagnola's Estate, 68 Cal. App. 732, 230 Pac. 188 (1924): New York Life 
Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 214 Pac. 61 (1923). If the wife does not object 
to the third party receiving all of the proceeds, she will be regarded as having made 
an inter vivos gift of her share, which is subject to a gift tax, but not an estate tax. 
Chase Nat'! Bank, 25 T.C. 617 (1955). See also Commissioner v. Allen, 108 F.2d 961 
(3d Cir. 1939). If an insurance company has paid the proceeds to the beneficiary in 
accordance with the terms of the policy, the company is fully discharged from all claims 
under the policy unless the wife has given written notice of her adverse claim. CAL. lNs. 
CODE § 10172. See also Blethen v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 198 Cal. 91, 243 Pac. 481 
(1926). 
13. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2033 states: "The value of the gross estate shall in-
clude the value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent 
at the time of his death." 
14. United States v. Stewart, 270 F.2d 894 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 861 U.S. 960 (1959); 
California Trust Co. v. Riddell, 136 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Quigley v. United States, 
59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 74162 (W.D. Wash. 1959); Louisa M. Carroll, 29 B.T.A. 11 (1933); 
Thompson v. Calvert, 301 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957): Estate of Leuthold, 52 
Wash. 2d 299, 324 P.2d 1103 (1958); Rev. Rul. 48, 1953-1 Cu111. BuLL. 892; Annot., 73 
A.L.R.2d 157, 229 (1960): see Mendenhall v. Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 441, 6 Cal, 
Rptr. 45 (1960); Treas. Reg. § 20,2042-l(c)(5) (1958); Rev. Rul. 54-272, 1954-2 CUM, 
BULL. 298; Rev. Rul. 232, 1953-2 CUM. BULL. 268. Contra, United States v. Waechter, 195 
F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1952), affirming 98 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash. 1951). However, since 
the decision upon which Waechter rested, In re Knight, 31 Wash. 2d 813, 199 P.2d 89 
(1948), has been reversed by Estate of Leuthold, supra, Waechter appears to have little 
weight. 
It has been suggested that the replacement cost of the policy should be used as the 
basis for the method of valuation as is done in non-community property states when 
the owner of a policy on the life of another dies before the insured. LOWNDES & KRAMER, 
FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT TAXES 284 & n.50 (1962): see authorities cited note 29 infra 
and accompanying text. " 
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necessary to determine whether the interest over which the wife had 
testamentary power was limited to one half of the cash surrender 
value of the policy measured at the time of her death, or extended 
to a one-half interest in the full amount of the policy, including the 
proceeds. In Donald Scott,15 a recent case of first impression, the Tax 
Court reasoned that since the wife's interest in the proceeds was only 
an expectancy terminated by her death, her heirs had received only a 
right to the half of the cash surrender value which had been included 
in her estate. Thus, the court concluded that the husband's estate · 
must include all of the insurance proceeds received by the bene-
ficiaries, less the half of the cash surrender value previously included 
in the wife's estate.16 
However, the Scott case is subject to criticism on two grounds. 
First, it is based on a mistaken understanding of California com-
munity property theory, and in particular the nature of the wife's 
interest in community property life insurance. To maintain that the 
wife has only an expectancy in the proceeds while the husband has a 
vested interest is contrary to the statutory declaration that the inter-
ests of each spouse shall be "equal."17 Furthermore, as pointed out 
previously, when the husband dies first the wife's vested right to half 
of the proceeds prevails over the rights of all others.18 Moreover, 
since the wife has the statutory power to make a testamentary dis-
position of all her ownership rights,19 there is no authority for hold-
ing that she cannot bequeath her community share of the policy, 
including the proceeds. The fact that the proceeds do not come into 
existence until after the wife's death should not defeat the right of 
the wife's heirs eventually to acquire the proceeds attributable to the 
community premiums. Her heirs are merely collecting her share of 
the community property which was under the husband's manage-
ment and did not become payable until the later death of the hus-
band, just as the wife collects her share of the property if the 
husband dies first. Furthermore, the mere fact that the wife's heirs 
do not acquire immediate possession of her share of the community 
property should not impair their eventual right to the proceeds upon 
the later death of the husband. Just as the husband has :fiduciary 
15. 43 T.C. 920 (1965), appeal pending before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. For an analysis of the Scott case in terms of California divorce law, see 13 
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 406 (1966). 
16. In Scott, the Commissioner treated the small amount of premiums paid from 
the husband's separate property before his marriage as de minimis. This was also 
apparently .true of the small difference in premiums paid after the wife's death by 
the husband (approximately $1850) and the sons, who were beneficiaries of the policy 
and heirs of the wife (approximately $2700). Thus, the insurance policy in this case 
was regarded as a community property policy in its entirety. 
17. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 161a; see note 5 supra. 
18. See cases cited note 12 supra and accompanying text. 
19. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201. 
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responsibilities to his wife during her life, he likewise has fiduciary 
responsibilities to her representatives after her death, and can be 
held accountable for improperly consuming or disposing of his wife's 
share of the community property.20 The husband is even authorized 
by statute to maintain control of community property during the ad-
ministration of his wife's estate unless distribution is necessary to 
carry the wife's will into effect.21 Obviously, the distribution of the 
proceeds is not possible at the time of the wife's death when the in-
sured husband is still living. Finally, the wife's right .to set aside an 
improper inter vivos or testamentary gift of her share of the com-
munity property survives her death and may be exercised by her 
representatives.22 Thus, to be consistent with community property 
theory, the wife's interest in the life insurance should pass to the 
heirs. It is arguable that they should be able to maintain their pro 
rata interest in the policy by either paying their share of the proceeds 
after the wife's death or by reimbursing the surviving spouse for 
premiums advanced on their behalf. If, however~ on the death of the 
wife the heirs wished to terminate the policy contrary to the wishes 
of the husband, it would appear that the community property policy 
could be partitioned into two separate policies, one to be controlled 
by the heirs and the other by the husband.23 
The second criticism which can be made of the Scott holding is 
that the Tax Court misconstrued United States v. Stewart,24 its sole 
authority for the proposition that a wife's only interest in the pro-
ceeds of community property insurance on her husband's life is an 
expectancy terminated by her death. The Stewart decision, which 
was concerned only with the value of the wife's rights in the policy 
at the time of her death and not with the extent of her rights in any 
future proceeds, simply followed the established rule that the value 
of the decedent wife's interest in her surviving husband's life insur-
ance was ~me half of the cash surrender value of the policy.2G The 
Tax Court based its interpretation of Stewart on a statement in the 
opinion that at the wife's death the right to half of the cash surrender 
value of the policy passed to the husband, who then became the sole 
owner of the insurance.26 This was construed by the Tax Court to 
20. Knego v. Grover, 208 Cal. App. 2d 134, 25 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1962). 
21. CAL. PROB. CODE § 202. 
22. Harris v. Harris, 57 Cal. 2d 367, 19 Cal. Rptr. 793, 369 P.2d 481 (1962), 10 
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 664 (1963); In re Field's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 151, 238 P.2d 578 (1952), 
23. Brawerman, Life Insurance in Community Property Estate Planning, 1951 So. 
CALIF. TAX INsr. 47, 74-75; Thurman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Community 
Property Life Insurance, 9 STAN. L. REv. 239, 266 (1957). 
24. 270 F.2d 894 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960 (1959), reversing 158 F. Supp. 25 
(N.D. Cal. 1957); 14 Sw. L.J. 526 (1960). 
25. See authorities cited note 14 supra and accompanying text. 
26. "[I]f the husband took the cash surrender value before the wife's death, it would 
remain community property in which she had a one-half interest, but if he took the 
cash surrender value after her death he would be the sole owner. In other words, the 
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mean that the wife's vested interest in the policy was limited to one 
half of the cash surrender value, and that her interest in the proceeds 
was a mere expectancy. However, the husband in Stewart became 
the sole owner of the policy not because his wife's interest in the 
proceeds was an expectancy that terminated, but because she passed 
all her interests in the insurance to him. Furthermore, by limiting 
the wife's interest to one half of the cash surrender value of the 
policy, the Tax Court's interpretation destroys the equality of inter-
ests in community property between the spouses that was established 
by legislative mandate27 and recognized by Stewart.28 
The underlying motivation that induced the court in Scott to 
limit the wife's interest to an expectancy was probably a fear that 
the wife's half of the proceeds would otherwise escape estate taxation. 
If the husband's estate includes only his half of the proceeds and 
the ·wife's estate at her earlier death included only half of the cash 
surrender value of the policy at that time, it is apparent that there 
will be no estate tax whatever on an amount equal to the difference 
between one half of the cash surrender value and one half of the 
proceeds. However, this is precisely the result reached in non-com-
munity property states when a person owning insurance on the life 
of another dies before the insured. The value of the policy included 
in the owner's estate for estate tax purposes is the replacement cost, 
or interpolated terminal reserve.29 Thus, the estate tax is only on 
the value of the policy at the time of the owner's death. There is no 
further estate tax when the proceeds come into existence at the death 
of the insured, since the insured does not have any of the "incidents 
of ownership." Just as there is no justification for including the in-
surance proceeds in the estate of the insured when the policy is 
owned by another person, there is no reason for including the com-
munity half of the proceeds owned by the wife in the estate of her 
insured husband. In both situations, the owner's interest in the in-
surance has already been taxed at its value at the time of the owner's 
death. 
If the Scott decision is upheld, the tax burden that it imposes by 
including all of the proceeds in the estate of the husband may be 
right to one-half of the cash value of the policies passed to the husband upon the death 
of the wife." United States v. Stewart, 270 F.2d 894, 898-99 (9th Cir. 1959). 
27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 161a. 
28. In reversing the lower court's holding that the wife's interest was only a "right 
of protection" that was extinguished by her death, the Stewart court stated that at her 
death the wife had a present, existing and equal interest with her husband. United 
States v. Stewart, 270 F.2d 894; 902 (9th Cir. 1959). 
29. DuPont v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 210 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 252 U.S. 878 (1956), 
affirming 18 T.C. 1134 (1952); Ethel M. Donaldson, 31 T.C. 729 (1959); INT. REv. CODE 
OF 1954, § 2033; Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a) (1958). This method of valuation is also used 
for gift tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(a) (1958); LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL 
EsTATE AND GIFT TAXES 287-88, 469 (1962). 
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avoided in other situations by dividing the insurance into two poli-
cies which are the separate property of each spouse.A0 The wife's
separate insurance policy on the life of her husband would be subject
to her testamentary disposition, and the proceeds could not be in-
cluded in her husband's estate at his later death. While her interest
in her separate policy may be valued at the higher replacement cost
or interpolated terminal reserve rather than the cash surrender value
at the time of her death,"' this should be more than offset by the
lessening of the tax burden that will result from keeping her half of
the proceeds out of her husband's estate at his later death.
30. There is no gift tax imposed upon the division of community property into
equal shares of separate property. Commissioner v. Mills, 183 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1950).
31. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 641156
